Danube developments against the backdrop of history and geopolitics: (Thoughts on the region-constituting role of the Danube) by Hardi, Tamás
269
1. Korrektur
Tamás Hardi 
Danube Developments against the 
Backdrop of History and Geopolitics
Thoughts on the region-constituting role of the Danube
Introduction
As traffic and delivery route, a river contributes significantly to organizing the economy 
of a region, and as such it also shapes the economic spatial structure. The investigative 
approach employed here primarily focuses on which role the river might have played 
in the economic development of the region in the various eras of economic history; in 
addition, the – especially geopolitical – reasons are examined, why the Danube could 
not fully meet the economic needs (cf. Hardi 2012).  
Two facts should be mentioned that provide reasons why the economy along the 
Danube has thus far made only little use of waterborne transport: on one hand, a 
regional system of relations whose axis and requirements the river might have been 
able to secure did not develop in any branch of the economy in our region. During the 
industrialization the national economies along the Danube rather became competitors 
instead of complementary systems. On the other hand, the water transport network that 
would have ensured the efficiency of waterborne transport, such as navigable tributaries, 
a system of distance-reducing and connecting channels, ports, connections to other 
traffic systems (e.g. railroads), was not developed. Thus the extremely long waterway 
existing today is primarily suitable for handling transit traffic and can contribute little 
to the development of the regional system of relations. The past two hundred years 
of development of the regional economy and related development of the Danube as 
waterway can be divided into characteristic sections. 
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19th century: grain transport, colonization, industrialization
In the 19th-century Danube region, the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg Empires 
pursued different interests with regard to Danube navigation. The main objective 
was safeguarding or obtaining influence on the Balkan, which was also connected to 
the possibility to control Danube navigation and trade. Russia wanted to free itself 
from its continental isolation in the direction of the Black Sea and already reached 
its shores in the 18th century. In 1794, to foster trade, the city of Odessa was 
founded, whose most important role it was to put the Russian grain on the world 
market. Among the chief interests of the Russians were free rein and trade at the 
Black Sea and in the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, likewise safeguarding 
the interests of the young grain trade port of Odessa (Gráfik 2004; LeDonne 2006). 
Due to expansion, conflicts emerged early between the Russian Empire and the 
Ottoman Empire ruling on the Balkan and thus also along the Danube, which led 
to a series of wars in the 18th–19th centuries. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire 
monopolized trade and thus also Danube trade; only vis-à-vis Austria did it make 
certain concessions. 
Prior to 1829 the most important function of the Danube for Austria was grain 
transport, on one hand from the Hungarian Lowlands to the center of the empire 
in Vienna, on the other hand – with reloading – to the Adriatic ports. Downstream 
transport on the Danube towards the Black Sea, however, was impeded by the Ottoman 
Empire as it held on to its trade monopoly.  
After the Napoleonic Wars free river navigation through several states had been 
proclaimed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, but only in principle, for the question 
of the Danube was not explicitly addressed back then. 
Corresponding to the transport directions, plans had already been made earlier to 
build canals in order to correct the unfavorable geographic conditions. Previously it 
had only been possible to transport the grain from the Hungarian lowlands via a long 
detour, first down the Tisza and then up the Danube, but after completion of the 
118-kilometer Great Bačka Canal in 1802 this could be done twenty days faster due 
to saving a distance of 227 kilometers. At the beginning of the 19th century plans were 
made to build a Danube-Save Canal, which would have meant saving 420 kilometers; 
in addition, the river Kolpa was also supposed to be canalized.  
The beginning of the next period (1829–1856) is associated with the Russian-
Turkish Peace Treaty of Edirne, as at that time the Russian Empire became the ruler 
over the territory along the Danube delta. At the same time, this date marked the end 
of the Ottoman trade monopoly not only along the Danube, but also in the Bosporus 
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strait. The previous grain export ban on the Balkan was lifted, which contributed to 
the upswing of Danube trade. 
As ruler over the Danube delta and in the interest of its own grain trade, however, 
Russia prevented the possibility of reaching the ocean via the Danube: it imposed 
quarantine on the Sulina Channel, and all ships were sent to Odessa for inspection 
(Krehbiel 1918). In 1840 an agreement was concluded with Austria assuring free 
navigation and trade, but Russia did not comply with these terms (Palotás 1984).
The next prominent event concerning Danube transport was the emergence of steam 
navigation. The engine ship revolutionized river ship transport, as laden barges were 
now able to go relatively fast upstream as well, and the ships’ ever increasing load 
capacity made transport more economical. 
These political and technical changes increased the significance of water trade 
considerably, and in 1829 under the leadership of István Széchenyi the First Im-
perial Royal Danube Steamship Company (Erste Kaiserlich-Königliche Donau-
dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft, DDSG) was founded, which should later gain strategic 
importance. 
On the middle and lower courses of the river the aim was to sidestep the estuary 
under Russian rule. As early as 1834, therefore, DDSG suggested building a canal that 
would have taken on the role of today’s Danube-Black Sea Canal (Turnock 1986). 
As this plan was thwarted by the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Dobruja, under 
pressure from Russia, in 1840 the Danube Steamship Company established a mailing 
route between Ruse and Varna. 
In political terms, the time between 1856 and 1914 can be labeled as the age in which 
the Danube gained an international standing. Economically it may be characterized as 
the era of industrialization and development of national economic areas. The year 1856 
marks an important date for the region, as a coalition of European powers succeeded in 
temporarily driving back Russian expansion in the Crimean War. From the perspective 
of the Danube it is important that with this free navigation all the way to the estuary 
became possible. In the interest of free access to the estuary, the victorious powers 
initiated – first only provisionally – the European Danube Commission (EDC), in 
which the victorious powers and Russia took part. The Habsburg monarchy remained 
the “organizing power” of the route via Brăila; under its leadership and involving also 
the Danube riparian countries the International Danube Commission was founded, 
which, however, existed only by name as attempts at pushing cooperation between 
Austria and the emancipating Danube principalities remained unsuccessful. By creating 
a body of regulations for a territory belonging to different countries, the EDC, on 
the other hand, established a special regime, and it was also permitted to enforce and 
sanction these regulations.  
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Thus, in the second half of the 19th century the Habsburg Empire played a quasi-
colonialist role along the Danube which was primarily based on the work of DDSG. By 
the 1880s, the latter had grown into the largest inland navigation company in the world, 
maintaining coal mines, railroads and shipyards (cf. Erdősi 2008). On the lower Danube 
its task was to organize the trade system between center and periphery; simultaneously 
it brought all modernizations to the regions along the lower Danube, where agriculture 
dominated (cf. Erdősi/Gál/Hajdú 2002). Navigation on the tributaries, by contrast, 
continued to remain underdeveloped – and this even despite the fact that the largest 
grain turnover was registered in the ports of tributaries, such as in Makó, Sziszek/Sisak 
and Szeged; only then followed Győr and Brăila (Der Schiffs- und Waren-Verkehr [...] 
1868). 
At that time expansion of the railroad network also began, establishing a serious 
rivalry with the waterway. The competition now setting in was reflected in the fact that 
integrating the economic areas of the forming national states was based on the railroads 
rather than the waterway, for railroads could be developed faster and more spectacularly 
than the waterway, thus depriving the latter of capital (Hoszpotzky 1908). 
From the 1860s onwards, the existing rivalry between railroad construction and 
navigation added a new dimension to the struggle for dominance. A first sign of this 
was the Danube and Black Sea Railway and Kustendje Harbour Company, Ltd. starting 
railroad construction in the Dobruja to shorten the long waterway in the estuary and 
speed up grain transport (cf. Jensen-Rossegger 1978); based on a similar initiative, the 
first Turkish railroad was built between Ruse and Varna. 
On the waterway, navigation conditions on the main arm were improved: from 1886 
to 1896 the navigable main riverbed between Dévény/Devín and Gönyű/Szigetköz 
was extended. A second important point of extension was the Iron Gate. The Danube 
Conference held in London in 1871 had decided that the riparian states were permitted 
to collect a toll from passing vessels to keep the navigation route in order. Until the 
Russo-Turkish War in 1877–1878, however, the riparian states made no further 
arrangements. Therefore, after the end of the war the following Berlin Congress put the 
Habsburg monarchy in charge of the tasks, responsibility for which was subsequently 
delegated to Hungary. The regulation and repair work of the navigation route was 
carried out between 1890 and 1898 (cf. Tőry 1954; Deák 1998); it was considered a 
tremendous achievement and secured shipping traffic on the Danube for more than 
70 years to come. 
Around the turn of the 20th century attention refocused on canal construction as 
it became clear that despite the expanded rail network water transport offered cost 
advantages for certain classes of goods. Expanding the waterway network was thus 
realized in all canal construction plans along the Danube. The canals served first to 
273
1. Korrektur
Danube Developments against the Backdrop of History and Geopolitics
expand and connect the individual parts of the inland waterway; second, to link the 
Danube with other waterways, such as Rhine, Elbe, Oder, and Weichsel; third, they 
should also facilitate reaching the ocean. To realize these plans, in 1901 the Austrian 
Waterway Act, in 1907 the Hungarian public river canalization plan, and in 1917 the 
Bavarian Canal Act came into being. Apart from grain transport, these state initiatives 
were meant to provide strong infrastructural support for industry (cf. Fekete 1907; 
Tellyesniczky 1918). In the young Danube states, planning also commenced: on English 
and German initiative and with the pertinent funding promises, in Serbia the plan 
emerged to reach the Aegean via the Vardar river, and in 1907 an American company 
prepared a preliminary draft to realize the Danube-Vardar Canal (cf. Jovanovski 1993). 
The era of the two world wars: the Danube as international 
gateway for a “landlocked” region
In the first half of the 20th century the role of the Danube changed: after World War 
I, several among the newly created states in Central Europe did not have access to an 
ocean. The peace treaty ending the war also determined that status of the Danube. 
To supervise the Black Sea estuary, the major powers revived the European Danube 
Commission, whose work was determined by the Paris Conference. Based on the earlier 
agreements and with participation from the Danube riparian states, the International 
Danube Commission was founded as well (cf. Lipták 1993).
At the conference the convention was adopted in which the basic status of the 
Danube is laid down.1 In this document all stretches of the water network – including 
the tributaries – that serve as gateways to the ocean for more than one country were 
declared international. In addition, this status applied for every existing or future 
canal and to other connecting waterways. Between the two world wars Great Britain 
attempted to return to its earlier shipping-based hegemony: it bought up the shipping 
companies of the defeated countries and sought to develop a leading position of power 
along the Danube (cf. Teichova/Ratcliffe 1985).
The international waterway thus gained major significance as the goods did not have 
to pass through the newly established customs borders during transport, but could be 
delivered directly to the sea. This fact proved particularly useful for Hungary, which 
was not only politically isolated by most of its neighboring countries, but had – as a 
result of the peace treaty – also to a large extent lost its economic resources, which had 
previously in part been procured by way of river shipping. 
1 Convention Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube, signed at Paris, July 23, 1921. http://www.
forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19210723-1.pdf
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In this situation, river/maritime shipping presented itself as a way out for foreign 
trade. After a trial period Hungary therefore considerably expanded its fleet by the end 
of the thirties, and that way Danube-maritime ships transported the goods directly to 
the Levante ports, the Near East and northern Africa (cf. Katona 2000). 
Thus the Danube was of fundamental importance particularly for the economic 
development of Hungary, but likewise for Austria and Germany; besides, it promoted 
German influence on the south-east European economies (cf. Basch 1944). In so doing, 
a colonialist-style system of relations developed between the entire region and Germany. 
As regards further development, no additional resources were available for the 
blueprints made at the beginning of the century; besides, the previously planned 
individual stretches of the waterway network as well as a majority of the canals would 
now have actually been situated on the territories of several countries, for which reason 
these plans were not pursued. 
World War II meant increased German predominance in the Danube valley. In 
1938–1939 the EDC and IDC activities were dissolved by Germany assisted by 
Romania and Danube navigation was subordinated to war transports. 
The second half of the 20th century –  
Soviet-eastward orientation
After World War II, various political powers deemed it necessary to establish a new 
Danube regime. The members of the Council of Foreign Ministers from the Danube 
countries came to the agreement that free navigation on the Danube had to be 
guaranteed for all citizens, trade ships and merchants of all states on the basis of equality 
and under the same rules.
Soviet influence now became manifest in the founding of joint enterprises with the 
national shipping companies and navigation almost entirely belonging to the Soviet 
sphere of interest; the newly initiated Danube Commission and the Belgrade Agreement 
of 1948 also came about under strong Soviet influence. The geoeconomic situation 
changed fundamentally: while earlier center-periphery trade had been conducted in 
the direction of the Austrian and later German economic center, now the political and 
economic center shifted to the East, and the geographic features of the Danube were 
much better suited for these trade flows. As raw materials from the East were brought 
to the middle and lower Danube region, the political center-periphery relationship 
was by no means reflected in the character of the shipments. Nevertheless, the Danube 
thus became an important pillar of Soviet hegemonial endeavors. This orientation also 
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determined developments such as the building of the Danube-Black Sea Canal, which 
reduced shipping times, or the final solution of the Iron Gate question (cf. Hardi 2012). 
The regulation of the section in the area of Szigetköz, on the other hand, was handled 
bilaterally between Czechoslovakia and Hungary: the agreement was concluded in 
1977, but was later canceled by Hungary with reference to ecological damage. The 
project was ultimately completed by Slovakia alone; to this day, it has not been possible 
to settle this question between the two countries for once and for all.
Lessons learned
The Rhine-Main-Danube Canal completed in 1992 did stimulate traffic on the upper 
course of the Danube, but the middle and lower sections continued to be used very 
little. It is of great significance, therefore, that in 1996 the AGN agreement2 was 
signed with assistance from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
This agreement contains all elements for the development of the water network whose 
necessity has indeed been expressed several times in the past two hundred years, but 
which has never been realized. Chances for implementing the project are still slim 
today, too, but the content of the agreement does at least confirm our statement at the 
beginning of the paper.
From the perspective of economic development and integration of the Danube 
Region, the riparian states have thus far only been able to make modest use of the 
opportunities provided by the river. The Danube has remained a one-track traffic axis, 
whose eminent relevance emerged only at the time of colonialist endeavors through the 
connection between the economy of the region and the Austrian, German and Soviet 
economies; in addition, it provided a link to the ocean for the isolated economies in 
the eastern part of Europe. Nonetheless, the internal regional system of relations barely 
strengthened the Danube, and developments in this direction stayed behind what could 
be expected. From everything stated thus far the conclusion can be drawn that the low 
utilization rate of the Danube is only partly rooted in geographic conditions and that 
it is in fact necessary to call the geopolitical constellations preventing realization of the 
expansion stages needed in the individual periods to account for it.
2 European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of International Importance. Geneva, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. 1996. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/conventn/agn.pdf
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